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Justice Versus Benevolence: A Modern Humean View
Mario J. Rizzo*
A single act of justice is frequently contrary to the public interest;
were it to stand alone, without being follow’d by other acts, may, in
itself, be very prejudicial to society. When a man of merit, of a
beneficent disposition, restores a great fortune to a miser, or
seditious bigot, he has acted justly and laudably, but the public is
the real sufferer. Nor is every single act of justice, consider’d apart,
more conducive to private interest, than to public; and ‘tis easily
conceiv’d how a man may impoverish himself by a single instance
of integrity, and have reason to wish, that with regard to that single
act, the laws of justice were for a moment suspended in the
universe. But however single acts of justice may be contrary, either
to public or private interest, ‘tis certain, that the whole plan or
scheme is highly conducive, or indeed absolutely requisite, both to
the support of society, and the well-being of every individual. ‘Tis
impossible to separate the good from the ill. Property must be
stable, and must be fix’d by general rules. Tho’ in one instance the
public be a sufferer, this momentary ill is amply compensated by
the steady prosecution of the rule, and by the peace and order,
which it establishes in society.1

INTRODUCTION
A longstanding tradition has developed in political and
legal philosophy, associated with such thinkers as Marcus
Tullius Cicero, David Hume, Adam Smith and Herbert
Spencer,
that
strongly
differentiates
justice
from
beneficence. Justice is the virtue necessary to create a
framework of social stability in which individuals can pursue
the other virtues, including beneficence, as they deem
appropriate. Some have referred to justice as a “duty of
perfect obligation”2 while referring to beneficence as a “duty
of imperfect obligation.”3 Perfect duties are relatively
determinate in the sense that there is a definite obligation to
perform in a particular way at a particular time. Justice refers
*

© 2008 Mario J. Rizzo.
* Department of Economics, New York University.
. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 497 (L. A. Selby-Bigge ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1740) [hereinafter HUME, HUMAN NATURE].
2
. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 48–49 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publ’g
Co. 1979) (1861).
3
. Id.
1
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to the idea of restoring an individual to his condition prior to
the commission of a wrong, such as breach of contract,
violation of property rights, or an attack on his physical
integrity. Since the moral obligation of justice is relatively
determinate it can and should be enforceable by law. On the
other hand, an imperfect duty is one which we may be
“bound to practice, but not toward any definite person, [and]
not at any prescribed time.” Beneficence is just such a virtue
and “though the act is obligatory, the particular occasions of
performing it are left to our choice.”4 The law, therefore,
cannot appropriately enforce duties of beneficence.5 The
fulfillment of these duties depends on many particular
circumstances of time and place; that is, on local and
personal knowledge that is prima facie unavailable to
governments.6
The independence of justice from the particular
circumstances of time and place relative to the dependence
of beneficence on such circumstances is an important factor
responsible for distinctive psychological aspects of these
virtues. For reasons I discuss below, I see that justice is an
abstract virtue which does not give the individual positive
psychological feedback in all cases. Indeed, as Hume
mentions in the opening quotation, a single act of justice
4

. Id. at 48.
. Adam Smith emphasizes the legal-enforceability issue in his
Lectures on Jurisprudence:
Perfect rights are those which we have a title to demand and if
refused to compel another to perform. What they [i.e., Pufendorf
and Hutcheson] call imperfect rights are those which correspond to
those duties which ought to be performed to us by others but
which we have no title to compel them to perform; they having it
entirely in their power to perform them or not . . . . A beggar is an
object of our charity and may be said to have a right to demand it;
but when we use the word right in this way it is not in a proper but
a metaphorical sense. The common way in which we understand
the word right, is the same as what we have called a perfect right,
and is that which relates to commutative justice. Imperfect rights,
again, refer to distributive justice. The former are the rights which
we are to consider, the latter not belonging properly to
jurisprudence, but rather to a system of morals as they do not fall
under the jurisdiction of the laws.
ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 9 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978) (1762–63).
6
. Consider, for example, the conclusion of Athol Fitzgibbons:
“[B]enevolence [for Smith] could not be legally enforced, because the civic
obligations of citizens depended on circumstances that usually were too
complex for codification.” ATHOL FITZGIBBONS, ADAM SMITH’S SYSTEM OF LIBERTY,
WEALTH AND VIRTUE: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 112
(1995).
5
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may be (rightly) perceived as contrary to the public or
private interest. It often takes a cognitive act of abstract
construal to see and to appreciate the value of justice.
Beneficence, on the other hand, is a concrete virtue. It has a
psychological core, which is the sympathy generated in the
agent by the pleasure or relief of suffering the patient
experiences
in
the
particular,
often
immediate,
circumstances that present themselves.7 Thus we often find
a “bias”8 in favor of approving acts of beneficence relative to
approving acts of justice. Unfortunately, such a bias has
social costs because less justice and more beneficence will
tend to be produced than is socially optimal. This holds true
at the level of inter-individual behavior, in the legislative
process, and in the judicial process.

1. HUME’S MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
Hume primarily concerned himself with explaining why
and how we approve or disapprove of mental dispositions or
character traits that act as the basis of actions. We approve
of those that are “useful or agreeable to the person himself
or to others.”9 We regard mental dispositions as useful if
their associated actions tend to benefit the self, others, or
society-at-large. Justice and integrity are two examples. But
since Hume is not a Benthamite utilitarian,10 approbation is
not reduced entirely to the utility of the act. Sometimes acts
fail to produce benefit through no fault of the agent, even if
they have a tendency, under normal conditions, to produce
such a benefit.11 Nevertheless, we see such a disposition as
7

. One of the reasons that beneficence is greater among close
relatives, friends, and even strangers in Good Samaritan cases than in
cases of people in need in far away and unpublicized places is that the
psychological and social distance between the agent and patient is less in
the former. And thus the positive psychological feedback deriving from
sympathy is greater.
8
. The word “bias” is used in a non-normative sense. The normativity
focuses on the consequence of the biased behavior in producing a negative
external effect.
9
. DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 268 (L. A. Selby-Bigge ed., Clarendon Press 1975) (1770)
[hereinafter HUME, ENQUIRIES] (emphasis added).
10
. A Benthamite utilitarian believes that we ought to approve or
disapprove of an act solely because of its consequences for the happiness
of human beings. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 2
(Laurence J. LaFleur ed. Hafner Publ’g Co. 1948) (1789).
11
. As Hume explains,
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a virtue. Other dispositions may seem intrinsically pleasing
or agreeable to the self or to others (e.g., decency and
cheerfulness).
As we can see from the examples above, in Hume’s
moral psychology, the root of our approval or disapproval of
mental states or dispositions lies in their tendency to
produce pre- or non-moral good. “No action can be virtuous,
or morally good, unless there be in human nature some
motive to produce it, distinct from a sense of morality.”12
Thus, the tendency of mental dispositions to generate
actions that produce a pre-moral benefit, whether a means
or an intrinsically or immediately agreeable state, for
oneself, others or society-at-large, is the rationale for moral
approbation. This does not tell us how the tendency to
produce pre-moral good causes us to approve certain mental
states. This is a complex story but, for our purposes here we
can be brief. Stephen Darwall gives us the basic structure of
Hume’s argument:
When we contemplate a (virtuous) trait, we are led by an
association of ideas to consider the pleasurable states produced or
realized by that trait, either in the agent himself on in other “with
whom he has any commerce” [Hume, Treatise, 590]. Through
sympathy or humanity we come either to have similar pleasurable
feelings ourselves (Treatise), or to be pleased at the pleasurable
feelings of those we are drawn to consider (Enquiry). This pleasure
is disinterested. Therefore, we feel disinterested pleasure in
contemplating the trait. Therefore, we feel the moral sentiment in
contemplating the trait. Therefore, the trait is a virtue.13

We approve of actions to the extent that they originate
from virtuous motives. Benevolence, for example, is the
mental disposition that causes beneficent actions.14 The
actions produce, under normal conditions, happiness,
‘Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the
motives that produced them, and consider the actions as signs or
indications of certain principles in the mind and temper. The
external performance has no merit. We must look within to find the
moral quality. This we cannot do directly; and therefore fix our
attention on actions, as on external signs. But these actions are
still considered as signs; and the ultimate object of our praise and
approbation is in the motive, that produc’d them.
HUME, HUMAN NATURE, supra note 1, at 477.
12
. Id. at 479 (italics in original omitted).
13
. Stephen Darwall, Hume and the Invention of Utilitarianism, in HUME
AND HUME’S CONNEXIONS 58, 68 (M. A. Stewart & John P. Wright eds., 1994).
14
. In general I follow the convention that benevolence refers to the
mental state and beneficence refers to the caused action.
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comfort, relief of suffering for others. We sympathetically
identify with these emotions and associate the sympathetic
feelings with the dispositions and the actions.
The value of Hume’s approach for our purposes is that
he emphasizes the importance of motives for virtuous
actions. Furthermore, these motives consist of mental
associations we make between actions and their agreeable
consequences. Thus the critical question we must face is:
Does the human mind always make the appropriate mental
associations?
To put the question in a more specific way: Is the human
mind subject to certain biases of association that lead us to
prefer beneficence to justice in certain predictable
circumstances? If the answer to this question is yes, then we
further ask: Does this biased preference have socially
harmful results?

2. NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL VIRTUES
From the perspective of Hume’s moral psychology one of
the most important distinctions he makes is between
“natural virtues” and “artificial virtues.”15 Benevolence is a
natural virtue and justice is an artificial virtue. The difference
lies primarily in the nature of motive that is behind our
approval or disapproval of a mental disposition and its
associated actions. Approval of natural virtues can be
explained only on the basis of fundamental human
propensities that are unrelated to the establishment of moral
conventions or, more generally, to the coordinated behavior
of other people. As Hume explains:
A parent flies to the relief of his child; transported by that natural
sympathy which actuates him, and which afford no leisure to
reflect on the sentiments or conduct of the rest of mankind in like
circumstances. A generous man cheerfully embraces the
opportunity of saving his friend; because he then feels himself
under the dominion of beneficent affections, nor is he concerned
whether any other person in the universe were ever before
actuated by such noble motives, or will ever afterwards prove their
influence.16

Furthermore, the rationale of the beneficent actions in
these cases will depend on specific circumstances of the
15

. For an extremely useful discussion of Hume’s view of virtues, see
JAMES BAILLE, HUME: ON MORALITY 143–88 (2000).
16
. HUME, ENQUIRIES, supra note 9, at 303.
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individual cases “without any more enlarged views . . . .”17
This particular person in this particular situation has this
particular problem to be ameliorated in this particular way.
Because of the self-contained or discrete nature of
beneficent actions the agent always approves of them, that
is, he approves of each instance of its manifestation. Thus,
there is positive feedback in the form of a positive
sympathetic feeling attendant upon our mental image of
each case of beneficence.
The artificial virtue of justice, on the other hand, is based
on a convention or social artifice. The convention is this:
Each of us agrees to respect property rights, contract, etc.,
on the condition that each other person will do so as well.
We each find it in our self-interest to constrain our narrower
self-interest in violating the laws of justice, but only if others
also so constrain themselves. So the social benefit of justice
is derived from the particular form of coordination of
individual behavior that it engenders. The “more enlarged
view” is of the essence here. Justice thus has an important
abstract component. The abstraction consists of its impact
on the pattern of social behavior.
From the point of view of society, the benefit resulting
from justice “is not the consequence of every individual
single act; but arises from the whole scheme or system
concurred in by the whole, or the greater part of the
society.”18 In their individual or particular application, the
laws of justice may “deprive, without scruple, a beneficent
man of all his possessions, if acquired by mistake, without a
good title; in order to bestow them on a selfish miser, who
has already heaped up immense stores of superfluous
riches.”19 Our benevolent sentiments rebel against this
because of the terrible mental image suggested by this
application.
The application of justice suppresses the importance of
many concrete individual circumstances that appeal to the
benevolent sentiments of human beings. Compare:
All of the laws of nature, which regulate property [justice] . . . are
general, and regard alone some essential circumstances of the
case, without taking into consideration the characters, situations,
and connexions of the person concerned, or any particular
17
18
19

. Id. at 304.
. Id.
. Id. at 305.
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consequences which may result from the determination of these
laws in any particular case which offers. 20

However, sympathetic particulars exert a powerful pull
on our sense of benevolence:
Now as everything, that is contiguous to us, either in space or time,
strikes upon us with such an idea, it has a proportional effect on
the will and passions, and commonly operates with more force than
any object, that lies in a more distant and obscure light. Tho’ we
may be fully convinc’d, that the latter object excels the former, we
are not able to regulate our actions by this judgment, but yield to
the solicitations of our passions, which always plead in favor of
what is near and contiguous. 21

In Hume’s moral psychology, then, there is a conflict
between benevolence and justice arising from the often
stronger pull of sympathetic concrete particulars compared
to the more rational or abstract appreciation of the value of
suppressing consideration of these particulars in the service
of justice.
3. CONSTRUAL LEVELS: AN INTRODUCTION
The law finds a poor, elderly, and ill person to have
inadequate title to the land upon which her home is built.
The law returns the property to a rich miser who will have
the house demolished and simply hold the vacant land for
possible future use.
How will such an event be characterized? Is it a failure of
benevolence? If so, the observer will experience moral
disapproval. Is it the return of property to its rightful owner?
If so, the observer will view it as an unfortunate, but
necessary, application of the rules of justice. He will, on the
whole, experience moral approval.
We can characterize any event in more than one way.
How we characterize it is significant for both evaluation and
for behavior. We can shed some light on the evaluative and
behavioral implications of the above event by applying the
findings of modern Construal Level Theory (CLT).22
Events, objects and actions can be construed at either a
low or high level. “Low-level construals are relatively
unstructured, contextualized representations that include
2
21
2
22
2
20

. Id. (emphasis added).
. HUME, HUMAN NATURE, supra note 1, at 535.
. Yaacov Trope et al., Construal Effects and Psychological Distance:
Effects on Representation, Prediction, Evaluation, and Behavior, 17 J.
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 83, 83 (2007).
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subordinate and incidental features of events. High-level
construals, in contrast, are schematic, decontextualized
representations that extract the gist from the available
information.”23 Acts of beneficence have the hallmarks of the
relatively concrete. They are discrete or self-contained acts.
Many particulars are relevant to their moral worth. Whether
the potential beneficiary is rich or poor, happy or sad, worldwise or somewhat incompetent, ill or healthy, etc. are all
important. We consider similar factors as relevant in the
condition of the potential benefactor. Thus, the immediate
context is essential. Acts of justice, on the other hand, have
the characteristics of a high-level construal. In the first place,
we suppress many particular circumstances, relevant to
beneficence, in the characterization of situations to which
the rules of justice are applied. For example, the above
litany of sympathetic characteristics is at least prima facie
irrelevant in cases of justice. Furthermore, we see that acts
of justice are not discrete or self-contained in terms of their
moral rationale. Their relatively abstract or decontextualized
conceptualization makes it easier to see the connection
among single acts of justice. It is an abstract understanding
that holds, “the whole plan or scheme is highly conducive, or
indeed absolutely requisite, both to the support of society,
and the well-being of every individual.”24
The findings of CLT support the general conclusion that,
the smaller the psychological distance between the event
and the evaluator-agent, the more likely it will be construed
at a low level. Psychological distance can be measured
across several dimensions, including the temporal, spatial,
social and hypothetical. Thus when individuals are asked to
characterize an event in the present or near future, in close
spatial proximity, involving people they care about, in a
realistic or probable scenario, they are more likely to
characterize it concretely. When the psychological distance
along any of these dimensions becomes greater, they are
more likely to characterize the event at an abstract level.
Consider now an individual who faces a real situation like
the one with which we started this section. He sees or hears
of an old, poor, ill person being displaced right now by a rich,
miserly land owner. It is occurring in a town very near to the
23
24

. Id.
. HUME, HUMAN NATURE, supra note 1, at 497.
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observer. The observer has a mother similar in age and
condition to the displaced old person. And since it is
happening, it is not a hypothetical scenario. In these
circumstances, CLT predicts a low-level construal of the
event. In our terms, this means it will be more likely to be
viewed as a failure of beneficence than as an application of
justice.
The predictions of CLT are also supported by the kind of
psychological feedback associated with seeing or performing
acts of beneficence compared to that associated with acts of
justice. The positive feedback from an act of justice requires
an abstract mental “image” or conception of the value of the
institution of property. This is less likely to be experienced
when psychological distance is small. On the other hand, the
feedback from an act of beneficence seems more concrete
and direct. It is more likely to be perceived under conditions
of less psychological distance.

4. EVALUATIVE AND BEHAVIORAL IMPLICATIONS OF
CONSTRUAL LEVELS
CLT has implications for evaluation of options at different
levels of construal and for the behavior of agents with
respect to those options.
The case of returning land to the person with the better
property title discussed above can provide a good example
of the impact of construal on valuation. This event has a
more favorable affective value at a high-level than a lowlevel of construal.25 At the high level the observer sees the
strengthening of the institution of justice. At the low level he
sees a poor person deprived of something she needs. This
event will seem more and more positive as psychological
distance increases. This occurs because, as distance
increases, there will be a greater weighting of high-level
values than low-level values. 26
On the other hand, imagine that a very benevolent judge
decides that the land should remain with the current
occupier due to her need. This event appears more positive
at a low level of construal than at a high-level. At the low
25

. This is a contingent value, that is, contingent on the level of
construal being determined. Construal is in turn determined by the
psychological distance between observer and event.
26
. It will also appear more negative as psychological distance
decreases because there will be greater weighting of low-level values.
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level the particular circumstances stand out and the
observer sees the comfort provided to the elderly woman. At
the high level the observer sees the weakening of the
institution of justice. Greater psychological distance will
reduce the evaluation of this event as the lower-level values
are weighted less. When psychological distance decreases
this act of leaving the land in the possession of the poor
woman will be construed at a low level and as an instance of
beneficence. The positive evaluation will be weighted more
than the negative high-level construal of a failure of justice.
Therefore, at the moment when the judicial or moral
decision is made, when psychological distance is small, there
will be a tendency for the decision-maker to approve acts of
beneficence rather than single acts of justice. This does not
mean that all spectators will prefer beneficence to justice.
Some decision-makers may place a very small low-level
construal value on beneficence and a very great high-level
construal value on justice. Thus, even when the low-level
value carries more weight, they may prefer justice.
Nevertheless, for any given distribution of low-level
valuations of justice (or beneficence), as psychological
distance falls there will be movement of the population of
decision-makers in the direction of valuing beneficence more
and justice less.
There are important implications for behavior. The
decision-maker is in a position to implement either an act of
justice or beneficence. Should “a man . . . of a beneficent
disposition [restore] a great fortune to a miser, or seditious
bigot”?27 If he possesses a beneficent disposition then he will
experience some cost or pain in returning the fortune to a
great miser at the expense of someone who is needy. This
cost, however, will not in itself be sufficient to prevent him
from doing so. CLT predicts that his behavior will depend on
whether he thinks of this cost as relating to only “secondary”
features of the situation. If he construes the situation at a
low level he will not. Furthermore, CLT predicts he will, in
fact, construe matters at a low level when psychological
distance is small. I have argued that psychological distance
will be small when the situation is immediately before the
decision-maker or observer either in person or in his mind. In
this case, he will focus on the unique, specific, and concrete.
27

. HUME, HUMAN NATURE, supra note 1, at 497.
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The beneficent disposition will dominate and he will not
return the property.
On the other hand, if he construes the situation at a high
level, he will divide it into “primary” or general features and
“secondary” or incidental features. The primary features
relate the return of property to the miser to the institution of
justice as well as its vital role in ensuring property rights.
High-level construal downplays the unique, concrete
considerations of the poor, elderly woman and her troubles.
As we have seen, this construal will be more likely the
greater the psychological distance. In these circumstances,
the man of beneficent disposition will still experience
displeasure at the thought of returning property to the
miser.28 Nevertheless, CLT research has found support for
the hypothesis that construal at a high level enhances “selfcontrol.” In other words, it increases the likelihood that the
individual will act in accordance with the primary or global
features of the situation and sacrifice the secondary when
that is required. Thus, high-level construal will encourage
deciding consistently with justice or approving such
decisions of others in like cases.
The self-control exhibited in this case is not primarily a
matter of preferring future benefits over immediate benefits.
The act of beneficence that is juxtaposed to the act of justice
in our example need not be construed in this way. One might
think of the single act of beneficence as one of many
instances of helping the unfortunate and, as such, an
application of a principle of beneficence.29 Under this
characterization the high-construal agent does not so much
sacrifice immediate for long-term benefits but, rather,
secondary for primary values.

5. THE “BIAS” AND ITS SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
From the point of view of greater temporal distance,
these preferences will seem “biased” toward beneficence.
Thus, looking at such events either retrospectively or
prospectively, justice will seem to be inadequately served.
2

28

. He might “have reason to wish, that with regard to that single act,
the laws of justice were for a moment suspended in the universe.” Id.
29
2
. Even as a principle, however, beneficence still requires in its
application attention to many more concrete details than an application of
a principle of justice. The latter, as we have seen above, suppresses many
facts of time and place both with respect to persons and their situations.
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Economic theory contains no tool or idea, however, that
enables us to say that the valuations and behavior relative
to high-level construal are correct and those relative to lowlevel construal are incorrect. All we can say as economists
or, more generally, as value-free social scientists is that the
perspectives are different. They are certainly inconsistent
with each other; but rendering them consistent can be done
by privileging either the low-level construal or the high.
The high-level construal is important, however, insofar
as it explains why individuals might seek to constrain their
beneficent behavior. Those in authoritative positions in
academia may strive not to get too deeply involved with a
particular student so as to be just in grading, granting
extensions, recommendation letters, etc. They may also
seek to impose rules on themselves such as grading
according to certain objective indicia instead of by general
impression or asking the students to put their ID number and
not their name on the exam paper.
It may also explain why individuals in their private
capacity approve of social and political rules that restrain
impulsive beneficent behavior or why, in their public
capacity, they write constitutions and laws that strictly apply
the rules of justice.
In addition to these purely positive explanations there is
some normative component. Each act that is contrary to
justice imposes a negative externality on the rest of
society.30 This occurs because it weakens the general
institutions that protect property, contract or personal
integrity. To the extent that the individual bias toward
30

. This raises the thorny problem of whether every beneficent
exception to justice imposes a negative externality. There are, of course,
well-known arguments that sometimes the rules of justice can be too strict
and that “equity” demands exceptions in accordance with beneficence.
This is a complex issue. In the first place, if we are talking about
incorporating rule-like exceptions to, say, the return of property to rightful
title holders, we are not talking about beneficence in its particularistic
sense at all. We may be talking about some welfare-enhancing tweaking
that itself requires a fairly abstract construal. For example, in certain class
of situations defined in fairly precise and objective terms, the optimal rule
may require some other decision. Low-level construals are not adequate to
this task. Secondly, if we are talking about a one-off exception based on
very high concrete costs in a particularly harsh case of the application of
justice, then it is hard to say anything systematic about that. The point of
the analysis above is that the bias toward beneficence is not confined to
these extreme cases.
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beneficence is not entirely offset by long-run self- or
institutional-constraints, the bias will reflect a negative
externality. In this sense only, can we label the “bias” as
undesirable.

6. POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY
In this section I address two possible applications of the
theoretical considerations outlined above. The first is rentseeking through the legislative process. The second is a
mechanism of possible decay in judicial decision-making
consistent with the rules of justice. These applications are
highly speculative and tentative.
A. RENT-SEEKING
Most individuals understand that special interests will
seek rents through any political process in which there is
possible entry. In the case of the application of the rules of
justice, we have seen that there exists a negative externality
attendant on deviations from those rules in the direction of
beneficence. In some cases we will find large concentrated
benefits to particular groups that make it worthwhile for
them to push for a specific weakening of the rules of justice.
Imposition of tariffs, for example, violates justice in the form
of freedom of contract.31
Suppose that the domestic steel producers and workers’
union support a rise in the protective tariff on imported steel
to assist workers who would otherwise lose their jobs and
localities which would be devastated by further closure of
steel plants. Some who are favorably inclined toward this
measure might call it “beneficence.”32
Our concern here is not the political economy of rentseeking but the effect of rent-seeking on the ways in which
ordinary citizens perceive the activities of the rent-seekers.
31

. A tariff on imported products is not only an economic issue but it is
an issue of justice as well. There is certainly a strong presumption that
people ought to be able to trade on whatever terms at which they
voluntarily arrive without the intervention of third parties. This is an
example of freedom of contract—part of Humean justice.
32
. In the political process it seems appropriate to put the word
beneficence in quotation marks because it is difficult to see true
beneficence when the support for deviations from justice comes from
groups which have a financial interest in them. Others might refer to the
measure as an instance of distributive “justice.” Following Hume, I do not
use the term justice in this way.
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To the extent that they construe these actions at a high level
they will find that issues of justice arise in their minds. Why
should people be forced to buy higher priced steel when, in
general, we allow people to buy and sell at whatever prices
the market will sustain? Other individuals, besides steel
workers, suffer from the effects of more able competitors—
why are they not protected? Would it be a good thing to
protect the prices of all buyers or sellers who are in “need?”
As one generalizes this issue the more unappealing this type
of intervention becomes. Public opposition will be easier to
generate. On the other hand, if the case is construed in lowlevel terms, the minds of citizens will be focused on the
particular sorrows and difficulties of the steel workers. In this
situation, gathering public support or, at least forestalling
public opposition, will be easier.
It is certainly possible that psychologically-sophisticated
rent-seekers might deliberately seek to have the public issue
construed in concrete terms. Suppose, however, they are not
so sophisticated. It is likely anyway that the issue will be
posed in low-level terms. This is because the specifics of
their situation are what the special interests know. In
addition, they are interested in the prevention or relief of
economic distress concentrated among their members and
not more abstract issues. They will make their case in
concrete and particular terms.
Research conducted by those working in the area of CLT
has shown, at least in a preliminary way, that when
experimental participants are primed with abstract thinking,
specifically, abstract words in a preliminary word-search
task, they become more oriented toward future benefits and
their level of impatience decreases. Those who were primed
with concrete words tended to be more present-oriented.33 If
these effects generalize, it would not be surprising to find
that the low-level construals of their problems advanced by
rent-seekers would tend to make citizens focus on the hereand-now beneficence aspects and not on the more abstract
or longer-term justice issues.

33

. See Trope et al., supra note 22, at 93; S.A. Malkoc et al., Impatience
is in the Mindset: Carryover Effects of Processing Abstractness in
Sequential Tasks (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill).
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We suppose that judges make their reputation, by and
large, by adhering to the precedents set by other judges.
Nevertheless, it may well be the case that judges differ in
their beneficence propensities. Some judges may be
tempted more than others to depart from justice in deciding
a particular case. These judges perhaps construe the issues
more concretely; that is, more in terms of the particular
circumstances in a discrete case. Low-level construal is their
personal predilection. For example, such a judge may feel
greater temptation to depart from the general rules that
enforce contracts against individuals in breach or impose
liability on negligent parties because the particularly
sympathetic circumstances of the party who is responsible in
each case. The judge will pay a certain price in terms of loss
of reputation but he feels it is worth it. If he decides
according to his beneficence preference, he will create a
precedent that moves the line of acceptable excuses
slightly. This will make it more likely that another judge with
a marginally lesser propensity to beneficence will find a
basis (in that first decision) for moving the line still farther.
While each judge imposes a negative externality on the
system, he is partially protected in reputation by the
previous decision and so the system moves toward a
weakening of the rules of justice. In rationalizing such
decisions the relatively-beneficent judge lowers the level of
problem-construal reflecting at least in a rough way his
personal predilection. In the circumstances outlined above,
the system of precedent can lower the level of construal in
the law.35
CONCLUSIONS
All actions can be characterized in more than one way.
This is especially important in those cases where motivations
and consequences are multifaceted.
David Hume
34

. This is a summary of the analysis in Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen
Whitman, The Camel’s Nose is in the Tent: Rules, Theories, and Slippery
Slopes, 51 UCLA L. REV. 539, 568–70 (2003).
35
. On the other hand, levels of construal might rise through the
mechanism of precedent as they have in First Amendment free-speech
cases. See Frederick Schauer, Harry Kalven and the Perils of Particularism,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 397, 403–04 (1989) (reviewing HARRY KALVEN, A WORTHY
TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (1988)).
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understood that the psychology of moral action is a critical
aspect of individual and social behavior.
In this Article I have shown that individuals may
characterize the same action as a lack of beneficence or as
the application of justice depending on how it is construed. A
single act of beneficence is a concrete virtue with immediate
positive affect or positive psychological feedback. Justice is
more abstract. Individuals may view a single act of justice
disapprovingly, even though the institution of justice is
necessary for the maintenance of society and social
cooperation. For my purposes, the contribution of modern
Construal Level Theory shows that there is predictability in
the way actions or events are construed. The smaller the
psychological distance between an action or event and the
decision-maker or observer the more likely the decisionmaker will construe it at a lower level of abstraction. Lowerlevel construal, I conjecture, is more likely to lead to the
approval of acts of beneficence relative to acts of justice.
This introduces a negative externality into the system of
moral, legal and even political decision-making. Too much
beneficence relative to justice, from the point of view of the
social optimum, will be produced. This need not be where
the process stops, however, if individuals in the private or
public capacity adopt rules and procedures to make higher
level construals of moral, legal, or political actions more
likely, thus rebalancing the system in favor of acts of justice.

